We dropped thousands of dangerous bombs in Adriatic sea because of Serbian spies in NATO: Confession of Trump's adviser

The new national security adviser to US President Donald Trump in the past dealt with the analysis of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia. Herbert Raymond McMaster, he taught in US military schools because kept a unit during in the first Gulf War and against Iraq at one time. While he taught at the Center for Strategic Leadership he wrote an essay "Cracks in the foundation," in which he described the shortcomings of US assessments of enemy forces and their intelligence failures.

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In a recognition of a kind, McMaster wrote that less than 5 percent of Serbian combat troops were destroyed in 78 days of bombing, and that the failure of NATO in this campaign became apparent only after the war was over. For this, according to him, Serbian intelligence sources were largely attributable.

McMaster says that the Yugoslav Army possessed a weak air force, which could not provide any significant resistance.

- Taking down of the American F-117 was pure coincidence, and all agree that it was a unique set of circumstances which should be practically ignored in any serious analysis of the conflict in Kosovo - says a new Trump adviser.

US President at the time, Bill Clinton, decided to intervene in the war in Kosovo to stop the Serbian army.

- Emphasis was placed on precision air strikes as a potential solution to the problem. More efficient air strikes were very appealing to the President who wanted to use force, but also wanted to reduce the risk to American soldiers and avoid negative consequences in public and in parliament - says McMaster.

The original Clinton plan foresaw only five days of air strikes that would force Slobodan Milosevic to withdraw and desist from continuing the war in Kosovo.

- There was a lot of confidence in the outcome of the war. Yugoslavia was a poor country that could not threaten NATO bases or communication channels - writes McMaster, but also warns that self-confidence does not lead to victory even when the war is at an end.

American satellites from space and unmanned aerial vehicles were following Serbian forces, but bad weather, clouds and mountain terrain significantly reduced information superiority they are accustomed to American soldiers. In addition, McMaster says that even after four years of numerous conversations with Milosevic after the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have not led to the fact that US intelligence may foresee Milosevic's military decisions and moves.

The planned five-day operation also stretched to several months. McMaster has openly said that the lack of flexibility was one of the key shortcomings of the NATO campaign in Kosovo.

- The ability of Serbs to acquire serious intelligence on Allied operations, despite the technological inferiority, calls into question the ability of information superiority even against an enemy with only basic skills - he wrote.

- Serbs would evacuate specific targets as soon as they were on the list for the attacks. Probably the Yugoslav government had spies in the NATO headquarters, and spies in front of the Aviano base in Italy regularly reported when the planes were moving in the military mission - wrote the current high Trump adviser.

 

Later it turned out that he was absolutely right because it was discovered that Pierre-Henri Bunel, a French officer in the military headquarters of NATO in Brussels, gave the Serbs intended targets and even gave some other sensitive documents. 

The conclusion of McMaster's work on american Military actions in Kosovo at the end of the nineties would not be taken with appreciation with his superiors.

- Less than 5 percent of Serbian combat troops were destroyed in 78 days of bombing. NATO's efforts in attacks on enemy ground forces apparently failed. All the extent of failure became apparent only after the war was over - McMaster wrote in his work, adding that NATO greatly exaggerated in their estimations of destroyed Serbian forces.

In diplomatic vocabulary, he said the analysts seriously lied when they spoke about the successes of air strikes by NATO planes.

Because American war planes were unable to find targets in Kosovo, and they cannot land with bombs, they dropped millions of dollars worth and dangerous american bombs into Adriatic sea or on some abandoned mountains.

(Telegraf.co.uk)